RP's former 5-time Speaker Joe de Venecia speaks before an international forum |
Statement of
Former Speaker Jose de Venecia, Founding Chairman of the International
Conference of Asian Political Parties (ICAPP)
On His Speech
and Meetings Last Week in Beijing
June 3, 2012
For the United States, its military
presence on the peripheries—the outer limits—of
the Chinese mainland may be a kind of “forward defense.” Since the nineteenth
century, American strategists have feared that it is from Asia that an invasion
of the US mainland would threaten. The Japanese and World War II justified that
fear.
But, for the Chinese, the US presence
so closed to its exposed industrial hinterland is a vestige of colonialism; a
trace of the ‘humiliation’ the Chinese suffered from the great powers for 150
years including several “unequal treaties.”
Hence, the regional crisis over contested
South China Sea islets involving principally China, Vietnam and the Philippines
is likely to become more serious and more protracted than we—as Southeast Asian
participants and bystanders—may expect.
And our individual states should not have to choose between the great
powers—because we want no new Cold
War in the Asia Pacific.
These are my key conclusions from
a series of meetings with senior Chinese officials, this year and last week in
Beijing, with the minister and two vice
ministers of the Communist Party of China, former senior officers of the People’s
Liberation Army, leaders of civil society organizations who are officials of
the Chinese parliament, former high-rank
diplomats and academics, on the sidelines of an international dialogue
sponsored by the Chinese Association for International Understanding (CAFIU).
I also had extended conversations with
Deputy Foreign Minister Fu Ying, their highly regarded lady diplomat, who seems
to be coordinating Chinese policy in the South China Sea (West Philippine Sea) as
our able Secretary Alberto del Rosario and Undersecretary Linda Basilio are
coordinating Philippine action.
AFP Modernization: Unrelated to Spratlys
I candidly informed her that the new
steps of President Benigno Aquino III, Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario,
and Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin to upgrade the Philippine Armed Forces is
one of high priority, since the AFP has perhaps the poorest equipment among
armed forces in Southeast Asia, and the program is of long standing, unrelated
to the disputes in the sea.
We should not have to choose between the great
powers
Before officials and civil society
leaders from Asia, Europe, North America and Africa, the message I brought on
behalf of ICAPP—the International Conference of Asian Political Parties, ruling
and opposition parties, made up of 318 member-parties from 52 Asian states— and
on behalf of CAPDI, an alliance of political parties and civil society
organizations, that East Asia’s greatest shared need is to preserve the bubble
of stability that has made our region the fastest growing in the world.
For us, the age of ideological
conflict is over. All our countries need to move beyond containment and
confrontation toward cooperation and mutual prosperity in their foreign
relations. We should not have to choose between the great powers. There are
actually more overriding issues that unite China and the U.S. than divide them.
I cited the Joint Statement of
President Hu Jintao and President Barack Obama of January 2011 as offering the
two sides a basis for rebuilding their historical ties.
In that declaration, the two leaders
affirmed that the United States welcomes a strong, prosperous, and successful
China that plays a greater role in world affairs; and China welcomes the United
States as an Asian-Pacific nation that contributes to peace, stability, and
prosperity in the region.
I believe this should also be the
policy of the Philippines and ASEAN in dealing with the two leading global
powers, the U.S. and China.
Set aside issue of sovereignty to explore Sea
jointly; Designate Fisheries Corridors
Specifically to resolve the
conflicting claims to the Spratlys, I proposed joint exploration and
development by the claimant states of the disputed area’s drilling of oil-gas
and mineral resources; and the designation of “fisheries corridors” that our
fishing fleets may exploit in an orderly and sustainable manner, and prevent
tensions, illegal fishing, and arrests in the sea.
To prevent conflicts between rival
claimants, I invoked the formula of Chinese statesman Deng Xiaoping, who was
responsible for China’s emergence as a major economic power, who advocated in
1987 “shelving the issue of sovereignty,”
in dealing with issues in the China Sea.
Initially, this approach would involve
an agreement on an oil-and-gas drilling program, equitably sharing the profits
of production before finally demilitarizing the disputed islets through the
phased withdrawal of armed garrisons which demilitarization I proposed in 1987.
At the end of this process, we will have converted a zone of conflict into a binding Zone of Peace, Friendship,
Cooperation, and Development.
Loss of Sabah
Yes, it is a correct step to take the
rules-based approach and bring the maritime dispute to the International
Tribunal of the Law of the Seas (ITLOS) if China agrees. But what if China does
not? Witness that to all intents and purposes, we have practically lost Sabah to
Malaysia, a much, much bigger contested asset, because Malaysia refused to join
the Philippines in bringing the Sabah claim to the International Court of
Justice for decision.
North Sea, Caspian Sea Development
I informed delegates to the conference
how envious we are that pragmatic, negotiated geo-political settlements led to
successful oil-and-gas development programs among European powers in the North
Sea, hydro-carbon riches benefitting the Central Asians and Eurasians in the
Caspian Sea, and joint sharing of oil
and gas revenues between Australia and tiny East Timor in their contested
waters.
Recovery
of lost territories is an emotional issue
From
my conversations, I sensed that, for the Chinese, the recovery of ‘lost
territories’ during the ‘period of weakness’ remains a highly emotional issue. Since
1950, China has used force to defend its periphery 30 times. These conflicts
included ‘border wars’ against the United States and U.N. forces (the Korean
War), France (on behalf of Vietnam), India in the Himalayas, Russia in the
Ussuri river border conflict in 1969 and Vietnam (a border war in 1979 and two
naval encounters, in 1974 and 1988.)
Mutual
Withdrawal in June; Beware the storms of July
On
the Scarborough Shoal (Panatag), as a practical solution, I proposed that both
sides consider pulling out their Coast Guard or government vessels, fishing
boats and auxiliaries, from the Scarborough Shoal from June 1 to June 10, in a
slow, without fanfare, simultaneous mutual disengagement, so nobody loses face,
to be completed preferably not later than June 9 – 10 (37th anniversary
of the start of Philippine-Chinese diplomatic relations). Or, if adjustments are needed, the same should
be quietly completed thereafter , after a few days, as the severe storms of
July would in any case drive out the ships of both sides out of Scarborough
Shoal. I reminded our Chinese and
Filipino friends that following bitter
historic debates, it was Mother Nature,
the volcano Mt. Pinatubo, that finally drove out the American military bases in
Clark and Subic.
The Multilateral
or Bilateral Approach
On
the issue of whether China and the Philippines should resolve the dispute
between them in bilateral or multilateral negotiations, the Chinese have
pointed out that they successfully resolved their land border conflicts with
Russia and Vietnam in bilateral, not multilateral negotiations and are continuing their bilateral talks with
India on the Himalayan positions. Let us
also talk to Malaysia and Brunei, the other claimants, who have not disputed
strongly with China.
Today,
Malaysia, Thailand, Cambodia, Pakistan, Myanmar, Singapore, Indonesia, the
Central Asians, Africans and Latin
Americans have major economic joint-ventures with China, drawing on huge
Chinese investments in energy, natural resources, infrastructure and tourism.
Before
we turn down the bilateral approach, let us talk to the other claimants, and we
ourselves, should talk directly to the Chinese, at first in informal bilateral
negotiations, listen to their proposal on the settlement of the dispute. We may
find our positions not too far apart.
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